- April 18, 2026
- Posted by: Kangming
- Categories: Economics, Innovation
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— How the Trade War is Reshaping the Logic of Globalization
A static “Eight Globalization Models” table only reveals the true dilemma of Chinese corporate globalization when overlaid with the policy timeline from 2018 to 2025.
Introduction: The Limitations of a Single Table
I recently came across a table summarizing the “Eight Globalization Models” for Chinese companies, ranging from “Product Export” to “Model Export,” with clear categorization and typical case studies. But if you stop at the table itself, you will miss the most critical information —
These models are not static; they are being reshaped by geopolitics.
Since the outbreak of the China-US trade war in 2018, the logic of “Capacity Export” and “Capital Export” has undergone fundamental changes. In this article, I want to use two typical cases — Anta’s acquisition of Arc’teryx and BYD’s factory plan in Mexico — to help you understand the full picture of this reshaping.
I. The “Golden Age” Before 2018: Efficiency First
Before the trade war, Chinese companies going global followed the classic logic of globalization:
- Product Export: Selling Chinese manufacturing to the world (Temu, SHEIN)
- Capacity Export: Building factories where labor is cheap (Vietnam, Bangladesh)
- Capital Export: Acquiring overseas brands to gain technology and market access (Geely’s acquisition of Volvo)
The core question at the time was: How to reduce costs and how to expand the market. The policy environment was friendly, and globalization was a consensus.
But in March 2018, the US launched the Section 301 investigation against China and announced additional tariffs. Everything began to change.
II. 2018–2019: The “Golden Window” for Capital Export
Anta’s €4.6 Billion Acquisition of Amer Sports: A Precise Strategic Arbitrage
In December 2018, the Anta consortium announced the acquisition of Finnish sporting goods giant Amer Sports (the parent company of Arc’teryx, Salomon, and Wilson). The deal was completed in February 2019, with Anta securing the final approval from Mexico’s antitrust authorities.
Why is this called a “golden window”?
The timing was too precise. This transaction occurred before the signing of the Phase One trade agreement (January 2020), falling between several key nodes:
- Before the expansion of CFIUS review: The 2018 FIRRMA Act strengthened US foreign investment review, but sporting goods did not belong to “sensitive sectors”
- Before the pandemic froze cross-border M&A: If it had been one year later, global capital flows would have stalled due to the pandemic
- Before comprehensive tariff increases: The US had already imposed 25% tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, and companies were realizing the cost of the “Made in China” label
What did Anta do right?
- Good target selection: A Finnish company, not US assets, avoiding geopolitical hotspots
- Clever structure design: Anta + FountainVest Partners + Tencent consortium, dispersing the “China label”
- Retaining Western teams: Not forcibly exporting Chinese management, allowing Amer Sports to maintain its “global brand” image
- Clear strategic returns: Gaining premium brands, bypassing tariff labels, with the Chinese market becoming the growth engine
The success of this deal transformed Anta from a “Chinese sports brand” into a “global outdoor goods group.” The explosive growth of Arc’teryx in the Chinese market, in turn, proved the foresight of this acquisition.
But this window has closed. Today’s CFIUS review scope has expanded to “sensitive personal data.” Although sporting goods are relatively safe, any M&A involving Chinese capital will face stricter political scrutiny.
III. 2020–2022: Supply Chain Restructuring and the “Mexico Springboard”
The pandemic compounded with the trade war, and Chinese companies began to consider the “China + 1” strategy. The US promoted “Nearshoring,” and Mexico became a key springboard.
Why Mexico?
- USMCA Agreement: The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement allows Mexican manufacturing to enter the US tariff-free
- Geographic advantage: Adjacent to the US, with low logistics costs
- Labor costs: Lower than China, and closer to the US market than Southeast Asia
In 2023, BYD announced its Mexico factory plan, with an annual production capacity of 150,000 electric vehicles. The strategic intent was clear: using Mexico as a gateway to the US market, avoiding the 100% EV tariff.
It seemed like a perfect plan at the time. But the policy environment was changing rapidly.
IV. 2023–2025: The “Mexico Dilemma” for Capacity Export
BYD’s Mexico plan encountered a “policy encirclement and suppression.”
Timeline: From Hope to Suspension
Table
| Time | Event | Signal |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | BYD announced Mexico factory plan | Strategic launch |
| Feb 2024 | US senators proposed 100% tariffs on Chinese vehicles assembled in Mexico | Blockade begins |
| May 2024 | US officially imposed 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs | Mexico springboard value weakened |
| Sep 2024 | BYD paused Mexico site selection, awaiting election results | Strategic wait-and-see |
| Jan 2025 | Trump returned to the White House | Geopolitical risk surged |
| Feb–Apr 2025 | Trump threatened 25% tariffs on Mexico, with cumulative tariffs on China reaching 145% | Mexico model failed |
| Mar 2025 | Chinese government delayed approval of BYD’s Mexico factory | Dual pincer attack formed |
| Jul 2025 | BYD officially announced the suspension of its Mexico factory plan | The “Mexico path” for capacity export ends |
The Most Ironic Twist
- US won’t let you in: The Trump administration believes that Chinese automakers building factories in Mexico is “tariff laundering,” threatening tariffs on Mexico and even demanding a renegotiation of USMCA
- China won’t let you out: In March 2025, the Chinese government delayed approval of BYD’s Mexico factory, fearing that EV technology (batteries, intelligent driving) would flow to the US through Mexico
This formed the “Dual Pincer Attack”: The US fears you entering, China fears you leaving. Companies are caught in the middle, unable to move.
Why is BYD not as lucky as Anta?
- Different industry sensitivity: Automotive is the core battlefield of Trump’s “America First,” and EVs are a strategic industry that both Biden and Trump are determined to protect. Sporting goods? No one cares.
- Different rule complexity: USMCA rules of origin require 75% North American content, and the post-2020 addition of “steel and aluminum must be melted in North America” makes it difficult for Chinese supply chains to meet the requirements
- Technology security anxiety: In 2025, China restricted the export of lithium iron phosphate preparation technology and high-end lithium battery technology, and even the Hungarian factory may face technology supply cuts
- Different timing: Anta completed its deal during the 2018 “policy ambiguous period,” while BYD encountered blockades during the 2023 “policy clarity period” — the window had already closed
V. Deep Mechanism: From “Efficiency First” to “Technology Sovereignty”
The true value of this “Eight Models” table lies in providing an analytical framework. But only when overlaid with the policy timeline can we see the dynamic game:
plain
Pre-2018: Globalization logic (Efficiency First)
↓
2018–2020: Tariff avoidance logic (Mexico springboard, overseas M&A)
↓
2020–2024: Supply chain security logic (Nearshoring, friend-shoring)
↓
2024–2025: Technology sovereignty logic (Dual blockade: US won't let you in, China won't let you out)Redefining the Concept of Going Global
Table
| Stage | Core Question | Success Factors |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 Product Export | How to sell? | Cost, channels |
| 2.0 Capacity Export | How to bypass tariffs? | Geographic arbitrage (Mexico → US) |
| 3.0 Capital Export | How to control brands? | M&A timing, target screening |
| 4.0 Model Export | How to survive under unfriendly rules? | Mixue Ice Cream & Tea: light assets, localization |
VI. Future Projection: What Models Will Rise After 2025?
Based on the above analysis, three trends can be predicted:
1. Capacity Export Shifting to the “Non-US Camp”
After the failure of the Mexico model, new springboards are forming:
- Hungary: BYD’s Szeged factory will start production in 2025, with an annual capacity of 150,000–300,000 vehicles. Hungary is China’s “ironclad friend” in the EU, with 44% of Chinese FDI to Europe flowing here
- Brazil: BYD is building a factory in Bahia, radiating the Latin American market
- Turkey: Leveraging EU customs union advantages to bypass tariff barriers
Core logic: Avoid the US tariff radius and establish capacity “outside the US sphere of influence.”
2. Capital Export Focusing on “Non-Sensitive Assets”
After the tightening of technology reviews, which sectors are relatively safe?
- Consumer goods: Clothing, food, beverages (Mixue Ice Cream & Tea, MINISO)
- Services: Logistics, finance, consulting
- Cultural IP: Black Myth: Wukong‘s global success proves that cultural products are not subject to technology reviews
Core logic: Avoid the battlefield of technology sovereignty competition.
3. Model Export Becoming Mainstream
Mixue Ice Cream & Tea has opened 20,000+ stores globally, and MINISO has laid out in 100+ countries. Their common characteristics:
- Light assets: Franchise model, not relying on heavy capital investment
- Fast turnover: Efficient supply chain, quickly responding to local demand
- Deep localization: Products, marketing, and management fully integrated into local markets
Core logic: Do not challenge any country’s industrial security, only be a “useful business partner.”
VII. Three Recommendations for Globalization Practitioners
1. Window Period Thinking
The cases of Anta and BYD tell us: The window for going global is fleeting, and increasingly depends on geopolitical judgment rather than pure business logic.
- End of 2018 was the window for capital export
- 2021–2022 was the window for capacity export
- 2024–2025 is the window for “non-US camp” capacity export
Each window period lasts about 2–3 years. Miss it and wait for the next one, but the next one may be completely different.
2. Identity Reconstruction Capability
Future companies going global need to master the ability to “de-identify”:
- Data localization: TikTok’s “Project Texas” (though it failed, the direction was correct)
- Capacity localization: BYD’s “Hungary solution” (in progress)
- Capital neutralization: Anta’s cross-border consortium structure (verified)
Core goal: Become an irreplaceable node in the host country’s industrial ecosystem, while avoiding triggering the home country’s technology security red lines.
3. Policy Early Warning System
Going global is no longer a “business decision” but a “geopolitical decision.” Companies need to establish:
- Policy monitoring team: Tracking target countries’ investment reviews, tariffs, and technology export controls
- Multi-country layout capability: Not putting all eggs in one basket (Mexico failure → Hungary/Brazil)
- Legal compliance front-loading: Introducing international sanctions and export control lawyers at the decision-making stage
Conclusion: Globalization Has Not Ended, But the Rules Have Changed
That “Eight Globalization Models” table was an “opportunity map” before 2018, and a “risk map” in 2025.
The real dilemma of Chinese corporate globalization is not “how to go out,” but “how to survive under the dual pincer attack.”
Anta’s luck lies in timing; BYD’s predicament lies in the era. Future successful globalizers need to simultaneously possess: business acumen, political judgment, and the ability to pivot quickly.
Globalization has not ended, but the rules have changed. Those who adapt to the new rules will find new opportunities.